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Fiscal and other rules in EU economic governance: 
helpful, largely irrelevant or unenforceable? 
Iain Begg1 
Abstract: 
EU Member States, particularly in the euro area, have been pushed to adopt more extensive and 
intrusive fiscal rules, but,what is the evidence that the rules are succeeding?. The EU level Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP) has been – and remains – the most visible rule-book, but it has been 
complemented by a profusion of national rules and by new provisions on other sources of 
macroeconomic imbalance. Much of the analysis of rules has concentrated on their technical merits, 
but tends to neglect the political economy of compliance. This paper examines the latter looking at 
compliance with fiscal rules at EU and Member State levels, and at the rules-based mechanisms for 
curbing other macroeconomic imbalances. It concludes that politically driven implementation and 
enforcement shortcomings have been given too little attention, putting at risk the integrity and 
effectiveness of the rules.  
Key words: 
Fiscal rules 
European economic governance 
Macroeconomic imbalances 
Political economy of compliance 
Fiscal councils in Europe 
JEL classifications: E61, F42, H11, H61, H77, H81Introduction 
In response to the severe crisis that erupted in the euro area after the dire state of Greek public 
finances was revealed, the thrust of many economic governance reforms has been to strengthen 
rules intended to tie the hands of policymakers. Despite persistent academic criticism of the Stability 
and Growth Pact (SGP), it continues to be at the heart the EU approach, although in the wake of the 
crisis it has been further reformed and supplemented by additional obligations affecting budgetary 
policy. These include the Fiscal Compact (agreed in 2011) and the ‘two-pack’ (agreed in 2013) which 
requires Euro Area members to submit draft budgets for scrutiny in the autumn before they are 
adopted.  As part of the reforms, EU countries have had to introduce domestic fiscal rules consistent 
with meeting a medium-term objective (MTO) to maintain fiscal sustainability. 
Recognising the role of other macroeconomic imbalances in causing problems in certain Member 
States, another innovation was the creation of an Excessive Imbalances Procedure (EIP), with many 
similarities to the SGP as an instrument of governance. It has preventative and corrective arms, 
along with the possibility of financial penalties for non-compliance. The European Commission 
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monitors a series of indicators including ones relating to the external accounts, the housing market, 
credit conditions and unemployment; latterly, various other, social, indicators have been added. 
Where these point to potentially disruptive imbalances, an ‘in-depth review’ is conducted for the 
Member State to establish how much imbalance exists. 
On the face of it, these reforms, together with the moves towards banking union, the creation of a 
permanent bailout fund in the shape of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the broadening 
of the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) amount to a far-reaching and substantive reform of 
economic governance. Assuming the implementation of further reforms following up from the Five 
Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al., 2015), an optimistic perspective is that enough has now been 
done, or is in train, to resolve the flaws in the Euro Area’s policy architecture. However, the design 
and establishment of policy mechanisms and processes are only part of the answer and leave open 
the parallel question of whether enough has been done to solve the basic political economy 
shortcomings in compliance. 
This paper examines the emerging evidence on outcomes to try to answer this latter question, and 
finds cause for concern. The next section discusses why resort to rules gained favour, recalling some 
of the main objections raised in the literature. Subsequent sections look, respectively, at experience 
of: compliance with EU fiscal rules and measures with preventative aims; national fiscal rules; and 
rule-based governance of other macroeconomic imbalances. A discussion of the political economy of 
compliance with rules and concluding comments complete the paper 
The case for rules 
Rules constraining policy-makers are, very simply, advocated to curtail political incentives to adopt 
policies likely to benefit the policy-makers, rather than the interests of the economy. They are a 
component of a wider, and rich, literature on the governance of (mainly) fiscal policy, although there 
are similar discussions around monetary policy. It encompasses issues such as the nature of the 
‘contract’ between citizens as principals and their governments as their agents (Besley, 2007), the 
most appropriate design of institutions (Hallerberg et al., 2007), and transparency (Begg, 2014), as 
well as the narrower question of numerical rules to guide policy-making (Kopits and Symansky, 1998; 
Wyplosz, 2012; Portes and Wren-Lewis, 2015; Bergman and Hutchison, 2015). Aligning economic 
and electoral cycles to maximise the chances of re-election in an ’opportunistic business cycle’, 
bribing electorates and favouring core supporters are all examples of behaviour extensively studied 
in the political economy literature (see, notably, Drazen, 2000). There is a general presumption that 
short-term considerations will dominate the policy discourse, hence rules are needed to make 
longer-term policy goals more salient. 
Numerical rules, according to Kopits and Symansky (1998: 2), should be understood ‘in a 
macroeconomic context, as a permanent constraint on fiscal policy, typically defined in terms of an 
indicator of overall fiscal performance’, usually relating to variants of the budget balance or 
government debt, or both, or to aggregate public spending. They go on to stress that a rule ‘is 
intended for application on a permanent basis by successive governments…[and] … to be credible, it 
must involve commitment over a reasonably long period of time’. Crucially, they distinguish a rule 
from the shorter-term targets imposed on a country subject to a macroeconomic adjustment 
programme, because the latter will tend to be time-limited. Permanence does not, however, mean 
rules cannot be changed: what can be enacted can also be altered or undone and there are plenty of 
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examples of rules being jettisoned when they become politically inconvenient. Drazen (2004), for 
example, refers to the rapid demise of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rule adopted in the US in 1985, 
while Kopits (2012: 153) notes how, when the current administration came to power in Hungary 
with a large parliamentary majority, it ‘inherited a rules-based fiscal framework which it chose to 
ignore’. 
Fiscal rules have been repeatedly advocated by bodies such as the IMF and the OECD, in the 
interests of good economic governance, with transparency also seen as a necessary ingredient 
(Bernanke, 2010). However, resort to rules poses a delicate governance challenge for the EU and its 
Member States, because they impinge on one of the core functions of the state and its relationship 
with citizens. The common-pool problem is at the heart of this dilemma insofar as the democratic 
process will tend to favour decisions pandering to current generations or interests, neglecting the 
longer-term; indeed, Wyplosz (2012: 499), noting the ubiquity of the bias towards deficits, says ‘the 
surprise is that some countries could be free of the bias’.  
Unlike competition policy or monetary policy, where delegation of operations, though not 
objectives, to an agency is the norm and can be defended on the grounds that the policies 
concerned, although they may involve distributional issues, require technical rather than political 
decision-making, fiscal policy is politically much more sensitive because it concerns the role of the 
state and goes to the heart of distributive politics. In short, as a core function of the state it is 
deemed to require democratic legitimation and not just the ‘output’ legitimation derived from good 
outcomes. A further point stressed by Wyplosz (2012) is that rules – despite the rationale of dealing 
with time-inconsistent politicians – can themselves function in a time-inconsistent manner if they 
lead to sub-optimal commitments. Even if the motivations of politicians are beyond reproach, 
targets or rules that lead them to prefer spending or tax options that meet these tests, rather than 
achieving a wider welfare objective, will have suboptimal outcomes. 
In the context of European integration, and especially the governance of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), a further, distinct justification for rules is to reduce damaging cross-border 
externalities. Rules, in this sense, serve as instruments for policy coordination and can be seen as a 
partial alternative to the explicit re-assignment of fiscal policy competencies to the supranational 
level. Here, too, there is a complication: with a common currency, monetary policy can only be used 
to deal with symmetric shocks, with the implication that fiscal policy has to take on asymmetric 
shocks. Yet the push towards common rules inhibits this use of fiscal policy (Portes and Wren-Lewis, 
2015). 
The costs of breaching a rule are, in many cases, reputational. But there has been increased resort to 
embedding the rule in a judicial framework. This can lead to the paradox that a government will 
change a rule rather than be caught breaking it (Drazen, 2004). Thus, looking at the history of fiscal 
rules in the US, Bernanke (2010) notes that the attempt to impose rules in 1985 (the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings law passed by Congress with the aim of eliminating the deficit over five years) had 
to be abandoned because it proved to be unattainable. He attributes this failure to the fact that the 
rule focused on the deficit, which is only partly under the control of the authorities because it is 
subject to the effects of unpredictable economic developments. Bergman et al. (2016) find that fiscal 
rules do result in improved primary balances, but only if there is a strong governance framework at 
the national level. They also note that because the Fiscal Compact reinforces balanced budget rules 
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and obliges countries to enhance independent scrutiny of fiscal policy, it is likely to reduce deficit 
bias in the EU. A possible implication of their findings is, though, the paradox that rules seem to 
work best where they are least needed, because the government is efficient. 
EU fiscal rules 
Although the long-run evidence on fiscal rules is reasonably persuasive on their success in assuring 
fiscal sustainability, the resort to rules in the EU has a broader rationale in achieving effective 
coordination. Critics of the euro have long highlighted the absence of a fiscal stabilisation capacity as 
a weakness of the Euro Area, among other gaps in what a durable (if not necessarily ‘optimal’) 
currency area needs.  Under EMU, lacking a federal competence for fiscal and structural policies to 
complement the supranational monetary policy, various mechanisms of coordination have been 
established, albeit with a decidedly uneven track-record. The nature of the governance relationship 
is also a consideration, insofar as it entails the EU level monitoring and setting rules and targets for 
the national level, rather than subjecting national decision-makers to domestic constraints. 
According to estimates by the European Commission of its “fiscal rule strength index”, all Member 
States either increased or maintained the strength of their medium-term fiscal frameworks between 
2010 and 2014.2 Yet, if judged purely by the budgetary indicators of EU Member States today, the 
verdict on fiscal rules would be pretty negative, even making allowances for the difficult 
circumstances of recent years which were hardly conducive to strengthening budgetary 
sustainability. Taking the five-year period from 2012, when the most acute phase of the successive 
crises ended, there is a mixed picture. Deficits have come down in the great majority of Member 
States; and in the few cases where they have risen, the governments had the requisite fiscal space to 
accommodate the increases. However, the public deficits in two of the Euro Area’s economies 
assisted during the euro crisis continues to worry the European Commission and vulnerabilities in 
several others have been highlighted in the annual country-specific recommendations issued as part 
of the ‘semester’ process. 
The debt picture is much less positive. In seventeen Member States, the debt-to-GDP ratio increased 
between 2012 and 2016. The unweighted average of debt ratios in the EU rose by 3.6 percentage 
points between 2012 and 2016, with increases of 12 points or more in six countries (Greece, Spain, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Slovenia and Finland). At the other end of the spectrum, the debt ratio in Ireland fell 
by 31 points. The average debt ratio in 2016 is projected to be 72.3%, having been 68.7% in 2012 
and 43% in 2007. Only eleven Member States are projected to have debt ratios in 2016 below the 
60% threshold, six of them in central and eastern Europe, along with Denmark, Luxemboug and 
Sweden. Six countries will still have debt in excess of 100% of annual GDP (Belgium, Greece, Spain, 
Italy, Cyprus and Portugal); and a further six will be in the range of 80-100% (Ireland, France, Croatia, 
Austria, Slovenia and UK). 
Over the long term, work undertaken by Andrle et al (2015) shows that, despite the many reforms 
that have taken place in the governance of fiscal policy in the EU, compliance remains disappointing. 
They note that half of the Euro Area members have missed the 60% debt target more than half the 
time since 1999 and, while the record on the 3% deficit target is a little better, especially in the ‘good 
times’ between 1999 and 2007, Greece and Portugal have missed the target in most years.  But the 
                                                          
2
 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/fiscal_rules/index_en.htm  
5 | P a g e  
 
politics rather than the economics of compliance arguably give most cause for concern. In the early 
years of the SGP, the now notorious rejection of sanctions in 2002/3 for breaches of the limits by 
France and Germany (it is often forgotten that Portugal was also in breach) undermined the 
credibility of the Pact.  
The Kafkaesque outcome of the latest episode of enforcement of EU fiscal discipline, concerning 
Portugal and Spain, illustrates how tricky enforcement is. Both Member States were found in mid-
July 2016 to have done too little to rein in their excessive deficits and should, consequently, have 
been fined under the rules of the SGP. Yet, as the headline of a press release from the Council of 
Ministers put it on 8 August,3 the ‘Council agrees to zero fines and new deadlines for Portugal and 
Spain’. For Spain, the Council found that ‘exceptional economic circumstances that would warrant a 
reduction of the amount of the fine do not exist’. Instead, Spain’s efforts to transform its economy 
were deemed to justify cancellation of the fine. 
Four observations are worth making about the lack of adherence to deficit and debt rules. First, and 
unsurprisingly, the Member States subject to formal macroeconomic adjustment programmes 
(including Spain which had a limited programme targeted at the banking sector) are in most cases 
the worst performers, although the extent of the improvement in the exceptional case of Ireland 
invites caution about drawing too firm a conclusion. Second, the risks to fiscal sustainability in the 
EU are arguably greatest in a number of Euro Area countries, although the UK is a striking exception. 
Third, there is no clear indication of a richer/poorer Member State cleavage, nor of a systematic 
divide between creditor and debtor countries. On the basis of these indicators, the Czech Republic 
and Estonia are among the most fiscally sound countries, as is Luxembourg; Germany has made 
great strides in curbing its debt accumulation, but two countries often bracketed with it (the 
Netherlands and Austria) have not. The fourth, more intriguing, finding is that three of the largest 
Member States (France, Italy and the UK) as well as Spain have vulnerable fiscal positions, while 
Germany and Poland look to be in better shape.  
The preventive approach: advance scrutiny of budgets 
The new procedure (the “two-pack”) under which Euro Area countries submit draft national budgets 
to the Commission by mid-October each year for scrutiny has now been applied four times since the 
legislation was passed in 2013, providing additional empirical material. In the 2015 assessment (of 
the budgets for 2016), five countries were deemed to be at risk of non-compliance with the SGP, 
seven broadly compliant and five compliant, a slight improvement (as measured by the numbers in 
each category) compared with 2014 (table 1). By contrast, and despite the (admittedly still tentative) 
improvement in overall macroeconomic conditions, the verdicts for 2016 (concerning the 2017 
budget plans) are less favourable. While the same five countries (Germany, Estonia, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Slovakia) were in line with the obligations they face under the SGP, the number 
at risk of non-compliance has increased from five to eight (one of which, Cyprus, is assessed for the 
first time).  
At the start of the process, in 2013, only two countries were deemed to be compliant (Estonia and 
Germany), while three others (France, the Netherlands and Slovenia) were ‘found to be compliant, 
but without any margin for possible slippage, as this would put the correction of the excessive deficit 
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at risk’. This second category was not used subsequently. What emerges from the examination of 
the four annual outcomes is that although some countries are consistently compliant, the process 
does not seem to be influencing others. Indeed, Spain, consistently in the last category, was 
highlighted in 2014 as being unlikely to achieve a ‘durable correction’. 
 
 
Table 1  Compliance of planned budgets with SGP 
Year 
Assessment 
2013 2014 2015 2016 
Compliant 
 
DE, EE DE, IE, LU, NL, 
SK 
DE, EE, LU, NL, 
SK 
DE, EE, LU, NL, 
SK 
Broadly compliant [or no 
margin for slippage - 
only used in 2013] 
BE, FR, NL, OS, 
SI, SK 
EE, LV, SI, FI BE, IE, FR, LV, 
MT, SI, FI 
IE, LV, MT, OS, 
{FR} 
At risk of non-
compliance 
ES, IT, LU, MT, FI BE, ES, FR, IT, 
MT, OS, PT 
ES, IT, LT, OS, PT BE, IT, CY, LT, SI, 
FI, {ES, PT} 
Subject to MAP 
Not in Euro 
EL, IE, CY, PT 
LV, LT   
EL, CY 
LT 
EL, CY EL 
Source: Own elaboration from Commission reports on draft budgetary plans 20174 
Key: red text is a deterioration from the previous year; green is an improvement; {countries in 
square brackets are under the corrective arm of the SGP in 2016} 
Assessments of national fiscal rules 
Concerns about the credible enforceability of EU rules (especially the SGP) lay behind the enactment 
of Council Directive 2011/EU/45 of 8th November 2011 ‘on requirements for budgetary frameworks 
of the Member States’. According to Article 2(c) of the directive, a fiscal framework should include 
‘country-specific numerical fiscal rules, which contribute to the consistency of Member States’ 
conduct of fiscal policy’. Chapter IV of the directive then spells out what is expected. In particular, 
Article 5(a) stipulates that the national rule should promote ‘compliance with the reference values 
on deficit and debt set in accordance with the TFEU’; in other words, the national rule has to 
facilitate adherence to the SGP.5 Although Article 6.2 mentions escape clauses, it states that these 
should apply only in ‘a limited number of specific circumstances’ consistent with fulfilling TFEU 
obligations, and ‘stringent procedures’ are required if non-compliance is to be permitted. 
A figure 1 reveals, there has been a steady rise in the number of national fiscal rules in the EU, such 
that by 2014 there was an average of four rules per Member State, compared with a total of just 
twelve in 1990. Most target the current budget balance, but there is also a growing number of rules 
aimed at restraining debt and setting limits on government expenditure, as well as a few prescribing 
how unanticipated increases in public revenue should be used. Although there is national discretion 
in how to transpose the directive, most Member States either already had appropriate legislation or 
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have now put it in place. Most of the rules are enacted through specific legislation, but some of 
them are written into constitutions.  
Figure 1  Number of fiscal rules in the EU 
 
Source: European Commission Fiscal Rules Database 
In parallel, the steady increase in the number of countries setting up independent fiscal councils (FC) 
has generated more scrutiny of how governments approach these rules. However, these councils 
have very varied mandates and some have less independence from government than the EU 
legislation foresees. An overview by Deutsche Bank Research explains the range of different 
approaches adopted for these councils, with some taking responsibility for official forecasts, as well 
as offering opinions on government plans and their execution, while others have a mandate limited 
to the latter.6 Fiscal councils should not be confused with audit bodies charged with verifying the 
probity of public spending, although the function of an FC may be performed by an existing audit 
body: in Finland, as an example, a division of the National Audit Office carries out the FC mandate. 
It is also noteworthy that according to an IMF study (Buva et al., 2015), the short-term nature of 
restrictions or the fact that the rules have been so prone to revision (the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia) means that they hardly qualify as fiscal rules. Neither the Czech Republic nor Poland has a 
fiscal council, and neither country is bound to introduce one because they are not signatories of the 
‘two-pack’. Slovenia’s fiscal council – as a full member of the euro area, it is subject to the two-pack 
obligation –  has been stalled because of political problems, notably the rejection in the spring of 
2016 of the government nominees for its membership. There was a consultative council in place 
from 2009 to 2012, but it ceased operating because of a lack of government support. 
Because FCs are, in most cases, also new to the governance framework, only a qualitative review of 
their assessments is possible, not least because in some countries (such as Spain, or Germany for 
sub-national government) the new rules are still being phased in. Relevant findings from recent 
reports issued by fiscal councils nevertheless reveal a number of common features, in addition to 
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confirming the deviations from the SGP rules already identified by Commission monitoring. Key 
points include: 
 Only few of the assessments give a clean bill of health to the respective governments and even 
some of those use qualifying words in their judgements, signalling that minor deviations are 
being ignored. An example is Malta where the latest verdict from the Maltese Fiscal Advisory 
Council is that the government’s plan ‘broadly meets the requirements prescribed in Article 39 
(8) of the Fiscal Responsibility Act’. Similarly, according to the Ufficio Parlamentare di Balancio 
(UPB), the deviation from the Italian expenditure rule in 2016 ‘should not be significant’, at 
barely 0.3% of GDP.  
 In several countries (examples are Austria, Slovakia and Spain) the deficit is considered by the FC 
to be more of a problem than is recognised by the government, and there is particular concern 
(Finland) about the lack of attention to the MTO. Thus the Austrian Fiskalrat judges that both 
the MTO and the structural adjustment ratio deviate significantly from the rule, whereas the 
government view is that it is a deviation, but not a significant one.  
 As exemplified by Italy, issues of interpretation render judgements difficult, particularly where a 
country seeks relief from the terms of the SGP, making use of the ‘guidance’ issued by the 
Commission.7 For 2017 and 2018, the UPB nevertheless concludes, somewhat delphically, that 
budget plans ‘do not represent an adjustment path towards the MTO that is consistent with the 
current interpretive framework of the European fiscal rules as transposed in Italian law’. 
 Some Member States have fiscal positions, especially on public debt, much more favourable 
than the new rule (Bulgaria and Lithuania, for example) . 
 Expenditure rules seem to be less binding (the Romanian Consiliul Fiscal calls them ‘soft’) than 
the hard rule of the deficit ceiling. Where, as in Sweden, the government has undertaken to fund 
any increase in spending by raising extra revenue, there can be concerns: the 
Finanspolitiskaradet qualified its 2016 verdict and finds8 that both the fiscal balance and the 
absence of a commitment to fund unexpected expenditure mean that Sweden is in ‘breach of 
the fiscal framework’. 
 Expenditure rules often cover only a proportion of public spending, adding to the scope for 
ambiguity. Thus, the Finnish National Audit Office is critical of the amount of expenditure 
outside the spending limits, which accounts for just under 30% of total government outlays. 
 There are instances of disagreement about the interpretation of expenditure rules, implying a 
lack of certainty (and hence transparency) in the application of the rule (Ireland, Spain).  
 Several FCs draw attention to implausibly optimistic assumptions by governments (Portugal, 
Ireland). For example, the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council’s own projections of the future fiscal 
balance are more cautious than those of the government, with the government expecting 
revenue to be more buoyant than the Council deems prudent.  
 The intensity of criticism varies, raising questions about how much notice is taken of findings 
that governments are ignoring rules. The Haut Conseil des Finances Publiques (HCFP) notes9 that 
estimates of the structural deficit in France built in to the draft budget for 2017 are lower than 
those published by international organisations and that the government’s growth forecasts are 
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on the optimistic side. The HCFP also argues that the government forecast is less prudent than in 
the two previous years and, in what press commentators consider to be an unprecedentedly 
severe verdict, doubts the ability of France to meet its obligations under EU rules. Conversely, in 
Belgium, the most recent opinion of the Conseil supérieur des finances describes as moderate 
the shortfall in attaining the MTO in 2015, noting the special circumstances associated with the 
influx of refugees in allowing the deficit to grow.10 But the report does not go much further than 
largely agreeing with the analysis of the European Commission. 
 One explanation is ambiguity about how rules should be applied. In Spain, the government 
claims that non-compliance in a single year does not need to be corrected in the subsequent 
year. For AIREF,11 this is considered not only to be inconsistent with the EU definition of an 
expenditure rule, but also to distort ‘the objective of any international rule of fiscal discipline in 
public expenditure’. AIREF notes further that the debt trajectory is not compliant with the rules 
and ascribes some of this to inappropriate rules for sub-national authorities. 
 More generally, the FC assessments highlight methodological differences – both with their 
respective governments and, in some respects, with the approach advocated by the European 
Commission – in relation to the best way of calibrating the output gap, validating forecasts and 
projecting expenditure growth. In Slovakia, for example, the Council for Budget Responsibility12 
explains why its output gap estimate differs from that of the Ministry of Finance, with the latter 
consistently higher. 
 Several FCs complain of slow or incomplete provision of necessary data and overly compressed 
timetables for key assessments (Spain, Ireland, Sweden), although evaluation work on Ireland 
(Jonung et al., 2015) suggests that ministry officials dispute elements of these criticisms. In Italy, 
the UPB says its work is hampered because budget projections are based on the assumption of 
unchanged policies and not the planned level of spending (as the relevant law seems to 
demand). 
 In some cases (examples are Estonia, Lithuania and Sweden), the FC suggests how government 
should go beyond the existing rule, as in this statement from the Estonian one: ‘the Fiscal 
Council recommends that a state budget be passed that sets a target of a small structural 
surplus for 2017’.13  
 From a different angle, Italy is an intriguing case because of the successive requests from its 
government to be allowed to deviate from the EU rules. The UPB assessment appears to regard 
the breaches of rules as to be expected and is muted in its language (similar reticence is in 
evidence from the Belgian FC). 
Rules on non-fiscal imbalances 
In principle, the strengthening of surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances other than in the fiscal 
policy domain is one of the key governance innovations of the last few years, with the potential to 
engender a more rounded approach to the oversight and coordination of national policies. By 
embracing much the same procedures as the SGP, including the resort to legal instruments and the 
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possibility of sanctions, the EIP can be thought of as adding to the rules-based approach to 
macroeconomic policy. These parallels inevitably prompt similar questions about effectiveness. 
An overview of imbalances in 2015 (European Commission, 2015) points to improvements in some 
areas, but notes the emergence of new problems in others, notably in external liabilities. It 
attributes reduced current account deficits more to falls in demand for imports, associated with 
lower GDP, than improved competitiveness, while the large surpluses observed in some countries 
are associated with weak investment rates. The overview calls for ‘more symmetric rebalancing’ 
(European Commission, 2015: 5), alongside more effort to deal with structural weaknesses, including 
the legacy of high private debt. In appealing to ‘systemic countries’ to use their ‘available fiscal 
space’, the report seems to come as close as is politically feasible to demanding that Germany do 
more to boost  domestic demand in the wider EU interest. However, although the scrutiny of 
imbalances is now into its fourth year, it is questionable whether it is having much effect on Member 
State policies. 
Although there has been repeated tweaking of the approach to surveillance, now encompassed 
within the European semester, it consists of three main steps. First, the Commission examines a 
range of indicators (the ‘alert mechanism’) to identify potential imbalances, making use of numerical 
thresholds, such as the extent of an external payments deficit or (importantly) surplus. Second, for 
those Member States in which there is prima facie evidence of imbalance, an  ‘in-depth review’ (IDR) 
is then conducted. The third stage is for the Commission to assess the extent of the imbalances and, 
if deemed sufficiently serious, to recommend corrective action (potentially backed by financial 
sanctions for failing to deal with the imbalance). Table 2 provides an overview of the verdicts in 
three annual cycles. 
Table 2  Assessments of macroeconomic imbalances, based on in-depth reviews 
 2014 2015 2016 
Excessive imbalances with corrective 
action plan 
NONE NONE NONE 
Excessive imbalances which require 
specific monitoring and continuing 
strong/decisive policy action 
SI   
 
BG, CY, FR, HR, 
IT, PT Excessive imbalance which require 
specific monitoring and strong/decisive 
policy action 
HR, IT BG, FR, HR, IT, PT 
Imbalances which require specific 
monitoring and strong/decisive policy 
action 
IE, ES, FR IE, ES, SI  
 
DE, IE, ES, NL, SI, 
FI, SE  Imbalances require monitoring and 
strong/decisive policy action 
HU DE. HU 
Imbalances require monitoring and policy 
action 
BE, BG, DE, NL, 
FI, SE, UK 
BE, NL, RO, FI, 
SE, UK 
No imbalances   AT, BE, EE, HU, 
RO, UK 
In adjustment or BoP programme (hence 
no in-depth review) 
CY, EL, PT, RO  CY, EL EL 
Source: own elaboration from European Commission web-site 
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In the 2016 cycle, the Commission simplified the classification of imbalance to four categories, albeit 
with no Member State placed in the most severe one in which a corrective action plan is required. 
Instead the countries subject to IDRs are split three ways into those with ‘excessive imbalances’, 
those with ‘imbalances’ and those found to have ‘no imbalances’. Four Member States previously 
found to have the lowest class of imbalances are now deemed to have no imbalances and two 
countries newly subject to IDRs are also found to have no imbalances. 
The judgements for 2016 will, or should, raise many an eyebrow. In 2015, the UK was described as 
having a shortage of housing expected to persist and to ‘continue to deserve attention’. Its current 
account deficit was identified as a problem in 2015 (as it was also in 2014) and remains well above 
the 4% threshold. Yet just a year later, the verdict on the UK was ‘no imbalances’. Even if, as might 
be imagined, this was for political reasons, it signals that imbalances can be swept under the carpet 
when expedient. For Sweden, in 2015 and again in 2016, high private debt and housing were seen as 
sources of imbalance, featuring as the one and only country-specific recommendation addressed to 
a country in the 2016 cycle. The contrast with the UK in interpretation is striking. 
Germany and France were both graded more severely in 2015 than in 2014, yet even though the 
German external surplus in 2016 was marginally higher than in previous years (and bearing in mind 
the cumulative effect of a persistent surplus, as well as projections that the surplus would creep 
higher still), Germany remains classified as being merely in imbalance, rather than excessive 
imbalance or a demand for corrective action. As with the SGP, doubts can be expressed about 
whether the economics behind the EIP are well-conceived, but from a governance standpoint, the 
inconsistency in application and the political over-ride that seems to occur does not inspire 
confidence. 
Discussion 
‘Useless laws weaken the necessary laws’ Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 
There may be something of a paradox around rules, namely that they are not really needed in 
countries in which institutions are strong enough to ensure sustainable fiscal and other economic 
policies, but do not work where needed because institutions are weak. Rules can, however, be 
inappropriate for a plethora of reasons, giving politicians a pretext for being dismissive of them. 
Indeed, in a prescient warning, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1995: 46), drawing on analysis of US 
experience of stricter rules, argued that rules preventing national governments from using fiscal 
policy to counter cyclical movements would result in ‘less fiscal stabilization and … greater output 
volatility’. Rules can be so pro-cyclical, especially in periods of economic slowdown, that they 
become economically perverse by entrenching stagnation, yet also provide too little incentive for 
fiscal retrenchment in good times. Exceptions to rules or deviations from their implementation, on 
the other hand, can weaken their rationale, while creative accounting can undermine the application 
of rules, while possibly also distorting priorities.  
However, just testing whether rules are complied with neglects the fact that they often tug fiscal 
policy towards the target enshrined in the rule: the speed limit on the road may be 120 kilometres 
per hour (kph), the observed average speed may be 130 kph, but the instances of 150 kph or more 
are rare. In this sense, the presence of the rule has an impact missed by looking only at full 
compliance. The examination of EU fiscal rules by Reuter (2015) yields convincing evidence of their 
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restraining effect on the extent to which governments allow fiscal positions to deviate from targets, 
even though rules were only complied with in about 50% of the years he studied. His results do, 
however, have to be qualified because the dataset he uses excludes a sizeable number of ‘rules’ 
identified elsewhere because they are, for one reason or another, either less legally binding or the 
data do not allow them to be tested. His results therefore relate mainly to the ‘harder’ rules in place, 
but they nevertheless offer interesting lessons. Breaches of expenditure rules, for instance, did not 
elicit reactions from governments, in contrast to debt and balanced budget rules.  
Moreover, the extent of overlap of rules makes it awkward to evaluate the success of any individual 
rule – see for example the complex interplay described by Guerguil et al. (2016). These authors find 
that there is great variation in the link between fiscal rules and counter-cyclicality, with rules that are 
investment friendly or include other exemptions more likely to avoid pro-cyclicality. However, 
exemptions increase the risk of creative accounting being used to circumvent rules. There is also 
doubt about whether EU rules have the same resonance as national rules. Kopits (2012: 152) asserts 
that ‘contrary to earlier beliefs, a supranational framework, such as the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact, can serve merely as an envelope for national fiscal rules, but cannot be a substitute for them’. 
He goes on to argue that home-grown rules, arrived at as a result of a broad consensus among 
domestic actors, are an essential part of fiscal discipline – implicitly criticising the initial insistence in 
the EMU policy framework on top-down policies. He also condemns weak enforcement at EU level. 
Lucio Pench of the European Commission, in thoughtful comments at a Bank of Italy seminar14, 
observes ‘that it is practically impossible to infer from the texts of the SGP how the rules will be 
applied to concrete cases without a detailed knowledge of’ the various documents issued by the 
Commission. He also refers to the ‘uneasy co-existence’ between the political and judicial elements 
of the framework, and describes how the lack of a central authority both explains the complexity of 
EU rules and undermines enforcement, with a lack of trust exacerbating the problems. Fabrizio 
Saccomanni, in comments at the same meeting, echoes Pench’s concerns about trust but also 
identifies a further paradox that, despite more extensive rules, ‘discretion has also increased’. 
Other paradoxes of the increased reliance on rules in EU governance can also be identified. As 
Debrun et al. (2008) show, the kind of rules affects whether or not they are pro-cyclical, with 
balanced budget rules likely to amplify cycles, whereas expenditure and revenue rules are more 
likely to be counter-cyclical. Often, it is not the rule per se that matters, but how the triggers for 
sanctions interact. In normal(ish) times, the interplay may not matter much, but if a budget balance 
deteriorates sharply because of an economic downturn (whether cyclical or structural), it is more 
likely to lead to breaches of rules. The ensuing double paradox is that the rule bites most when it is 
least appropriate, yet as exemptions become more logical, the very basis of rules is undermined. 
Concluding remarks 
‘Slow delivery on promises made is a phenomenon that more and more risks undermining the 
Union’s credibility’ – Juncker, 2016 State of the Union address 
There has been extensive, if not always fully appreciated, recasting of economic governance in 
Europe since the financial crisis in 2007-9 and, more so, since the euro crisis from 2010 onwards. 
                                                          
14
 http://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/collana-seminari-convegni/2016-0020/Beyond_the_Austerity_Dispute_-
_New_Priorities_for_Fiscal_Policy.pdf  
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Although disputes about the underlying economics rumble on, there is a logic to the overall 
architecture and some of the reforms undertaken have been bolder than is customary for a Union 
not renowned for its decisiveness and ability to see the bigger picture. The reforms have also 
corrected some of the shortcomings in EMU, though more remains to be done. The new policy 
framework is, nevertheless, open to the criticism that it entrenches one view of an optimal approach 
to macroeconomic governance – notably reliance on rules – at the expense of others. 
In reviewing its role in Euro Area fiscal surveillance, Kopits (2016: 9) finds that the IMF relied too 
much on the EU, but also that although some of the recent EU reforms are well intentioned and the 
numerical rules sound, ‘the difficulty of measuring these metrics in real time can render them 
ineffectual’. His comments reflect a longstanding concern about EU economic governance that 
implementation rarely lives up to expectations. Some slippage may be built into the design or into 
the mechanisms of operation, but what is more damaging is the propensity for rules either to be 
ignored or regarded as tangential to policy priorities. The evidence on post crisis compliance with 
both fiscal rules and expectations on macroeconomic imbalances is not encouraging. It suggests that 
discipline emanating from ‘Brussels’ has too little effect and, as a direct consequence, will not result 
in the extent of coordination of policy considered necessary for EMU. 
At the EU level, episodes such as the 2002/3 one involving France and Germany or the 2016 
decisions on zero fines for Portugal and Spain can, at a stroke, undermine commitment, with the 
attendant risk of rendering the rules ineffective. Such politically approved breaches mean that in the 
absence of unambiguous automaticity in implementation, even the most cleverly conceived rules 
will not achieve their aims. If, in addition, governments actively search for ways around rules, be it 
through statistical fudging, redefinitions of coverage or the meaning of a cycle, let alone explicit use 
of escape clauses, the very philosophy of rules as an approach to tie the hands of governments will 
progressively lose conviction. 
An unanswered question is whether any restraining effect of fiscal rules is enduring. More generally, 
fiscal rules or supply-side rules may be vulnerable to a variant of Goodhart’s Law, asserting that as 
soon as a variable is targeted for policy purposes, it becomes unfit for purpose. Potential solutions to 
such shortcomings are partly to be found in judicious design and careful attention to the incentives 
facing governments, but other political economy dimensions of rules, especially their enforcement 
and acceptability to the public, also have to be given attention. The extent of breaches of rules 
identified in this paper suggests these shortcomings may be intractable. 
Rules-based governance in the EU may, therefore, have reached its limits because of the many 
shortcomings in the approach, with the implication that something more or different is needed. As 
Larch (2016: 4) has argued, things might have been worse had rules not been adopted, but ‘when 
push comes to shove, adherence to and enforcement of the commonly agreed EU fiscal rules 
remains imperfect at best’. National rules might fare better if, as Kopits (2012) believes, they stand a 
greater chance of securing a consensus among national actors, but the evidence on implementation 
presented in this paper is not encouraging. It suggests that quite apart from technical questions of 
the optimal design, the natural instinct of governments is to find ways of maintaining their scope for 
discretion. Even if the existence of a rule does inhibit excess, political economy arguments point to a 
gradual weakening of commitments to respect rules. 
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Is there another way? Larch (2016) makes the interesting suggestion of separating the stabilisation 
function of fiscal policy from its distributive and allocative ones. Plainly, the macroeconomic 
dimension of fiscal policy cannot be wholly divorced from its distributive role, but very different 
mixes of allocative and distributive outcomes are conceivable within the same stabilisation 
parameters. His proposal is that an independent body, perhaps the fiscal council, should decide on 
the fiscal stance, leaving the composition of taxes and spending for political decision. There would 
be formidable problems of accountability and, even more so, of legitimacy, but these also arise with 
rules and if the latter fall short of, or seem incapable of, achieving the desired economic outcomes, 
then a second-best may be an improvement.  
Fundamentally, though, the EU faces the dilemma that reliance on fiscal and other rules is not 
enough to assure sustainable macroeconomic stability in a context in which politicians are not only 
adept at circumventing them, but garner popular support for doing so. 
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